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Comment  Worawan Chandoevwit
The main objective of this chapter is to study the impact of population aging 
on both public and private intergenerational transfers in Japan in the last 
two decades. The highlights of the chapter are the last two sections relating 
to: (a) population aging, (b) intergeneration transfers, (c) two demographic 
dividends and changing pattern of lifecycle deﬁ  cits, and (d) life cycle real-
locations. The result from the last part is quite interesting.
This chapter systematically elaborates the facts about a rapid demographic 
transition, and changes of social security expenditure and family support. 
Generally, many of us know that Japan has already moved into aging popu-
lation, but this chapter shows how it had evolved.
Worawan Chandoevwit is research director of the Thailand Development Research In-
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The declining of total fertility rate (TFR) and mortality rate including a 
higher life expectancy are factors that resulted in a higher share of elderly 
and aging society. In the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve-  year period of 1950 to 2005, TFR de-
clined from 3.6 to 1.3. Life expectancy at birth for both males and females 
increased approximately by twenty years. It would have been interesting if 
the chapter had estimated which factors between declining TFR and mortal-
ity rate had a stronger eﬀect on a rapid increasing share of elderly.
It is quite well known that TFR in Japan is currently low—one of the 
lowest in the world. But, in fact, not many people know that the sharp reduc-
tion of TFR occurred between 1947 and 1957 (ﬁ  gure 4.2). In this decade 
TFR reduced from 4.5 to 2. This chapter should have mentioned what 
caused these substantial reductions. Was it because of the eﬀectiveness of 
the abortion law in 1948 that made the number of births reduce by almost 
500,000 in 1950? It was shown in a National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research (IPSS) study (2006) that about 35 percent of mar-
ried Japanese women experienced induced abortion in 1967. This chapter 
should have also mentioned why the TFR reduced from 2.2 to 1.6 in 1966 
and then rebounded to 2.3 in 1967. What kind of shock decreased the num-
ber of births by 500,000 in only one year?
The ﬁ  rst three parts of this chapter are the overview of Japanese demo-
graphic transition, public transfers, values of family support, and social 
security systems and the reforms. The authors generally emphasize the roles 
of universal pension and health insurance in 1961, Japan’s structural reform 
in 1973, the bubble in mid- 1980, and the lost decade in 1990s. These factors 
are raised to explain age structural shift of Japanese population and changes 
of family role on supporting elderly. The roles of pension and health insur-
ance may be important, but sometimes are overemphasized. For example, 
the changes of expectation of Japanese married women to depend on their 
children for old-  age security were remarkable from 1950 to 1960, before 
Japan had the universal pension (ﬁ  gure 4.5). In that ten- year period, the pro-
portion of Japanese married women expecting to depend on their children 
for old-  age security declined from 65 to 35 percent; or reduced by 30 per-
centage points. After 1961—or the ﬁ  rst year of the universal pension—the 
proportion declined from 35 to 10 percent in 2005. It took forty-  four years 
for the proportion to decline by 25 percentage points. It may be inaccurate 
to conclude that the change of expectation was from the public pension.
One of the upsides of this chapter is the use of survey data to explain 
Japanese behavior and attitude. Such surveys are not easy for nonJapanese 
to obtain, particularly for the long series of the survey results.
What is so serious for Japan is the population prospect. To prove this we 
can simply compare the share of elderly in the twenty-  year period of 1985 
to 2005, and 2005 to 2025. In 1985, the share of those aged above sixty-  ﬁ  ve 
was 10.3 and total dependency ratio was 46.7. In 2005, the share of those 
aged above sixty-  ﬁ  ve increased by 10 percentage points to 20.2, and total 
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will increase by 11 percentage points to 31.0, and total dependency ratio will 
increase by 20 percentage points to 70. It will be hard for the working-  age 
group to live in such a burden.
Some countries make policy responses by helping families cope with child 
care burdens. For example, mothers in France are ﬂ  exible to work from 
home so that they can take care of their children while working. No mothers 
in Japan have such an option. In Japan, about half of employed married 
women work part-  time, and about 75 percent of part-  time workers are 
women. The Child Care and Family Care Leave Law (2005) does not guar-
antee that these workers will not be terminated from their jobs if they ask for 
child care leave. There are loopholes in the law that allow employers to do 
so (Hassett 2008). In addition, in January 2007, Japan’s Health, Labor, and 
Welfare Minister stated that “The number of women aged between ﬁ  fteen 
to ﬁ  fty is ﬁ  xed. Because the number of birth- giving machines and devices is 
ﬁ  xed, all we can do is ask them to do their best per head” (McCurry 2007).
This chapter illustrates the ﬁ  rst and second demographic dividends quite 
well. When fertility and mortality are falling, the changes of population 
age structure lead to an increase in the working ages relative to nonwork-
ing age group(s), and the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend. Japan experienced 
the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend in 1945 to mid-  1990. When the ﬁ  rst demo-
graphic dividend was moving close to zero between 1975 and 1980, the sec-
ond demographic dividend was moving into the positive zone. Figures 4.8 
and 4.9 show that the period between 2005 and 2025 is not a good time for 
Japanese.
Elderly in Japan do accumulate wealth as the source of support for their 
consumption. Such action could have a positive eﬀect on growth. However, 
one should also consider the distribution of wealth that has been ignored. 
This chapter emphasizes the role of second dividend as it states that “A 
key point is that in countries that rely on transfers, both public and famil-
ial, in meeting the retirement needs of the elderly, the second demographic 
dividend will not emerge. . . . The second dividend is aﬀected not only by 
the numbers of the elderly persons relative to younger persons, but also by 
the extent to which consumers and policy makers are forward-  looking and 
respond eﬀectively to the demographic changes that are anticipated in the 
years ahead” (p. 146). In developing countries where the distribution of 
wealth and income are unequal, the policy promoting individual wealth 
accumulation for retirement only may end up with a large pool of poor 
elderly who were unable to save or accumulate wealth.
Wealth accumulation in the form of real and ﬁ  nancial assets cannot be 
done without risks. Wealth accumulation in the form of land has become 
less popular among the elderly. It could be because their prices have gone 
too high. It might be because they know that population is declining, which 
should not make an upward trend for the demand for land as it has in the 
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market risks and how to manage them may help people to make decisions 
about their wealth management. Life-  time saving just to ﬁ  nd that only half 
is remaining at the retirement age is painful. The chapter also mentions that 
71 percent of population aged twenty and over have no knowledge about 
investment in equities and bonds and 57 percent have no knowledge about 
ﬁ  nancial products.
Contemporary young Japanese are, in general, not happy with being in 
an aging society. However, the last part of the chapter shows a positive 
impact of elderly on younger generation. People in early retirement (sixty 
to seventy-  ﬁ  ve years old) actually make net intrafamily transfers to other 
age groups (ﬁ  gure 4.13). Their large portions of consumption are from labor 
income and income from assets (ﬁ  gure 4.15).
Why do older people decide to make a transfer to their oﬀspring, knowing 
that pension beneﬁ  ts would fall short of their living expenses from age sixty? 
It could be altruism or intrafamily old age insurance. Once they retire, they 
live in a quiet and lonely environment. Any accident could happen easily 
to an elderly person at home. If they live with their children, those incidents 
will be mitigated. Should they live alone, they have to make some contribu-
tion in exchange of the visits from their children and grandchildren. The 
visits have some cost. Transfers from the elderly, therefore, could be a reward 
for their tender-  loving care to their parents.
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Comment  Alejandro N. Herrin
While providing an interesting account of Japan’s experiences in population 
aging, the chapter also provides insights for analyzing policy issues related 
to economic-  demographic and social changes in developing countries cur-
rently undergoing age structure change of varying timing and speed, and 
at varying stage of socioeconomic development. I focus my comments on 
these insights for developing countries.
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